Payments Academy
Point Detail
Point 1 Money laundering is the process of making money from crime look like
Point 2 Real laundering rarely follows the textbook in a neat order
Point 3 For a business analyst, the key point is that anti money laundering
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What Money Laundering Really Looks Like

AML, KYC and Fraud Prevention, Lesson 1 of 8, Narration 2:09, D12 Risk, compliance and regulation

Correspondent bankingAML

What you will learn

Your objective. By the end of this lesson, you will be able to explain money laundering really looks like. Money laundering is the process of making money from crime look like it came from a legitimate source, so that it can be spent or invested without attracting attention.

Why it matters. For a business analyst, the key point is that anti money laundering controls are embedded in ordinary payment and account processes, not bolted on as a separate system.

Chapter objective: Learner explains AML and KYC controls, including customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, and suspicious activity reporting, and identifies red flags in payment patterns. Learner practises this skill on realistic banking cases, explaining the reasoning clearly and using correct terminology throughout the work.

Key learning points

  • Money laundering
  • Integration: bringing money back into
  • They might use mule accounts
  • Variety: why anti money laundering
  • Requirements work in this area therefore

Key terms

Correspondent banking: A service where one bank holds accounts for another bank so the second bank can make payments in currencies or countries where it has no branch.

AML: Anti money laundering, the set of laws, rules and controls that stop criminals from hiding the proceeds of crime through the financial system.

Regulatory comparison showing What Money Laundering Really Looks Like.

Practise this lesson

Exercise

Decide what the screening or monitoring outcome should be for the scenario in this lesson.

Use the lists, rules and thresholds in this lesson.

  1. What to do. State whether the payment is stopped, held, frozen or released, and what must be recorded for audit.

Correct result. A true match against a sanctions list stops the payment. A false positive is cleared with a reason recorded. An alert that is escalated becomes a case, and a case that meets the threshold becomes a suspicious activity report.

Why. Screening is a control, not a suggestion. A missed true match is a regulatory breach, and an unexplained clearance is an audit finding.

Check your understanding

Practice question

In anti money laundering, what is the purpose of customer due diligence at onboarding?

Takeaway and next step

What to remember

For a business analyst, the key point is that anti money laundering controls are embedded in ordinary payment and account processes, not bolted on as a separate system.

Run the exception from this lesson and follow the investigation to its resolution.

Open the Exception Investigation Simulator →

Builds on "Fines, Enforcement and Lessons".

Transcript and full text

Show transcript

Money laundering is the process of making money from crime look like it came from a legitimate source, so that it can be spent or invested without attracting attention. The classic model describes three stages. Placement is getting the cash into the financial system, for example by depositing small amounts across many accounts, a technique known as smurfing. Layering is moving the money through a chain of transactions, companies and countries to hide its origin, often using shell companies and complex trade invoices. Integration is bringing the money back into the economy as apparently clean funds, for example by buying property or investing in a business. A bank's controls must work at every stage, because a control that only watches deposits will miss the layering that happens afterwards. Real laundering rarely follows the textbook in a neat order. A criminal might use trade based laundering, over invoicing or under invoicing goods so that value moves across borders disguised as trade. They might use mule accounts, where ordinary people are paid to receive and forward money, often recruited through fake job adverts. They might use cryptocurrency, prepaid cards, or gambling platforms to move value quickly. They might also use the bank's own products, such as trade finance, correspondent banking or private banking, because those services move large values and involve complex structures. This variety is why anti money laundering is a risk based discipline, not a fixed checklist, and why staff judgement matters as much as automated rules. For a business analyst, the key point is that anti money laundering controls are embedded in ordinary payment and account processes, not bolted on as a separate system. When a customer opens an account, when a payment is made, when a limit is changed, the AML system is watching. Requirements work in this area therefore covers customer risk rating, transaction monitoring rules, alert handling, case management and regulatory reporting. A BA who understands the laundering typologies can write better rules and better user stories, because they understand what behaviour the system is trying to catch and what a genuine customer looks like by comparison. Trade-based money laundering is the typology that best illustrates how laundering works in payments. A criminal exports goods worth 100,000 dollars and invoices them at 500,000 dollars. The importer pays 500,000 dollars, and the extra 400,000 dollars is the laundered money, now disguised as a legitimate trade payment. Or the criminal over-ships: the invoice is for 1,000 units at 100 dollars each, but 5,000 units are shipped, and the extra 4,000 units are sold for cash. The payment looks like a normal trade payment, the invoice looks normal, and the goods are real. The typology is only caught when an analyst compares the invoice value to the market price, or the shipped quantity to the ordered quantity, and finds the discrepancy. The three stages of money laundering are placement, layering, and integration, and each stage uses payments differently. Placement is getting the cash into the financial system, usually through a cash deposit, a money service business, or a purchase. Layering is moving the money through a series of transactions to obscure its origin, usually through multiple accounts, multiple countries, and multiple payment types. Integration is bringing the money back into the legitimate economy, usually through a property purchase, a business investment, or a loan. A payment that is part of layering will look like a normal payment, and the only clue is the pattern: many payments, to many beneficiaries, in many countries, with no clear business reason. The red flags for trade-based laundering are specific. The invoice value is significantly above or below the market price. The goods are shipped to a country that does not produce or consume them. The payment is made by a third party, not by the buyer. The goods are described vaguely, as general merchandise or electronics, rather than specifically. The shipment is routed through multiple countries for no clear reason. A transaction monitoring scenario that checks the invoice value against a market price database, and that flags payments where the value differs by more than 20 percent, will catch the cases that a simple amount threshold will miss.

Money laundering is the process of making money from crime look like it came from a legitimate source, so that it can be spent or invested without attracting attention. The classic model describes three stages. Placement is getting the cash into the financial system, for example by depositing small amounts across many accounts, a technique known as smurfing. Layering is moving the money through a chain of transactions, companies and countries to hide its origin, often using shell companies and complex trade invoices. Integration is bringing the money back into the economy as apparently clean funds, for example by buying property or investing in a business. A bank's controls must work at every stage, because a control that only watches deposits will miss the layering that happens afterwards.

Real laundering rarely follows the textbook in a neat order. A criminal might use trade based laundering, over invoicing or under invoicing goods so that value moves across borders disguised as trade. They might use mule accounts, where ordinary people are paid to receive and forward money, often recruited through fake job adverts. They might use cryptocurrency, prepaid cards, or gambling platforms to move value quickly. They might also use the bank's own products, such as trade finance, correspondent banking or private banking, because those services move large values and involve complex structures. This variety is why anti money laundering is a risk based discipline, not a fixed checklist, and why staff judgement matters as much as automated rules.

For a business analyst, the key point is that anti money laundering controls are embedded in ordinary payment and account processes, not bolted on as a separate system. When a customer opens an account, when a payment is made, when a limit is changed, the AML system is watching. Requirements work in this area therefore covers customer risk rating, transaction monitoring rules, alert handling, case management and regulatory reporting. A BA who understands the laundering typologies can write better rules and better user stories, because they understand what behaviour the system is trying to catch and what a genuine customer looks like by comparison.

Trade-based money laundering is the typology that best illustrates how laundering works in payments. A criminal exports goods worth 100,000 dollars and invoices them at 500,000 dollars. The importer pays 500,000 dollars, and the extra 400,000 dollars is the laundered money, now disguised as a legitimate trade payment. Or the criminal over-ships: the invoice is for 1,000 units at 100 dollars each, but 5,000 units are shipped, and the extra 4,000 units are sold for cash. The payment looks like a normal trade payment, the invoice looks normal, and the goods are real. The typology is only caught when an analyst compares the invoice value to the market price, or the shipped quantity to the ordered quantity, and finds the discrepancy.

The three stages of money laundering are placement, layering, and integration, and each stage uses payments differently. Placement is getting the cash into the financial system, usually through a cash deposit, a money service business, or a purchase. Layering is moving the money through a series of transactions to obscure its origin, usually through multiple accounts, multiple countries, and multiple payment types. Integration is bringing the money back into the legitimate economy, usually through a property purchase, a business investment, or a loan. A payment that is part of layering will look like a normal payment, and the only clue is the pattern: many payments, to many beneficiaries, in many countries, with no clear business reason.

The red flags for trade-based laundering are specific. The invoice value is significantly above or below the market price. The goods are shipped to a country that does not produce or consume them. The payment is made by a third party, not by the buyer. The goods are described vaguely, as general merchandise or electronics, rather than specifically. The shipment is routed through multiple countries for no clear reason. A transaction monitoring scenario that checks the invoice value against a market price database, and that flags payments where the value differs by more than 20 percent, will catch the cases that a simple amount threshold will miss.

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